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Cornhusker Economics
Role of Information and Communication on Spatial Conservation Auction
Performance: Evidence from a Laboratory Experiment
Market Report
Livestock and Products,
Weekly Average
Nebraska Slaughter Steers,
35-65% Choice, Live Weight. . . . . . .
Nebraska Feeder Steers,
Med. & Large Frame, 550-600 lb. . . . .
Nebraska Feeder Steers,
Med. & Large Frame 750-800 lb. . .. .
Choice Boxed Beef,
600-750 lb. Carcass. . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Western Corn Belt Base Hog Price
Carcass, Negotiated . . . . . . . . . . . . . ..
Pork Carcass Cutout, 185 lb. Carcass
51-52% Lean. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Slaughter Lambs, wooled and shorn,
135-165 lb. National. . . . . . .
National Carcass Lamb Cutout
FOB. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Crops,
Daily Spot Prices
Wheat, No. 1, H.W.
Imperial, bu. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Corn, No. 2, Yellow
Columbus, bu. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Soybeans, No. 1, Yellow
Columbus, bu. . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . .
Grain Sorghum, No.2, Yellow
Dorchester, cwt. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Oats, No. 2, Heavy
Minneapolis, Mn, bu. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Feed
Alfalfa, Large Square Bales,
Good to Premium, RFV 160-185
Northeast Nebraska, ton. . . . . . . . . . .
Alfalfa, Large Rounds, Good
Platte Valley, ton. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Grass Hay, Large Rounds, Good
Nebraska, ton. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . .
Dried Distillers Grains, 10% Moisture
Nebraska Average. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Wet Distillers Grains, 65-70% Moisture
Nebraska Average. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
⃰ No Market

Year
Ago

117.56

4 Wks
Ago

*

7-6-18

111.00

171.62

183.76

*

173.38

158.13

*

221.09

226.95

209.65

87.77

78.89

76.84

103.98

78.07

84.69

185.44

162.85

162.89

425.01

379.29

377.52

4.57

4.78

4.56

3.63

3.49

3.36

9.47

8.79

7.83

6.20

5.40

5.18

2.78

2.90

2.87

147.50

170.00

75.00

100.00

107.50

102.50

100.00

103.50

144.00

106.00

42.00

40.50

37.10

*

*

Policy makers such as the USDA are interested in
producers voluntarily adopting pro-environmental
land use practices on their properties as these land
uses deliver various ecosystem service benefits. As a
result, they have implemented incentive based policies such as the Conservation Reserve Program (CRP)
(Hellerstein et al., 2015). The CRP involves a reverse
auction in which producers submit bids for adopting
different land use practices. In running these auctions,
agencies are interested in both cost-effectiveness i.e.
procuring land use projects which yield the highest
level of ecosystem service benefits for the money
spent and specific environmental goals. One key goal
is project procurement involving the same land use
implemented on neighboring properties/parcels or
those within some distance of each other. Such spatial
contiguity is important as coordinated land management can magnify the production of different ecosystem service benefits such as water pollution reduction,
lower habitat fragmentation and enhanced biodiversity conservation, and increased pollination services to
name a few.
In this study, we focus on the impact of two features
on the performance of a spatial conservation auction
i.e. an auction that explicitly targets spatial contiguity.
The first feature is the amount of information revealed to bidders and the second is the possibility for
auction participants to communicate with each other.
We are interested in the first feature since procurement auctions in general, and conservation auctions
in particular, can be quite complex for bidders, as the
items being procured are often evaluated based on
multiple characteristics in addition to their price, including quality, quantity, delivery time, etc. In these
settings, providing information can facilitate bidding.
Yet, more information can also lead to higher rent
premiums, an issue especially relevant for conserva-
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tion auction policies given the extensive rent seeking that
has been documented in the CRP auctions over multiple
signups (Ulber et al., 2011). Next, our interest in studying
the impact of communication stems from the fact that
communication is a reality on agricultural landscapes.
Moreover, for a spatial auction communication can be beneficial as it can coordinate bid submissions by neighbors
especially if there are multiple land uses to choose from
(which usually is the case for conservation auctions). Yet,
communication can also lead to collusive bidding, low auction competitiveness and hence low cost-effectiveness,
none of which are desirable outcomes.
Given this context, we conducted a laboratory economic
experiment with university students to evaluate spatial conservation auction performance given communication and

We implement three information treatments using a
between subject format: NO-INFO, in which participants are not shown the magnitude of the environmental quality value of the three available items, VALUE in which subjects receive absolute environmental
benefits information and RANK, in which only the
relative ranking of the three items is revealed. The
communication treatments are also implemented in a
between subject format – NO-COMM in which subjects cannot communicate with each other and
COMM in which a players communicates with their
two neighbors in every round prior to bid submission.
Thus, we obtain 6 different experimental treatments as
presented in Table 1.

Table 1: Experimental Design

Information Treatment
Communication Treatment

Without Communication
With Communication

Without Benefit Information
NO-COMM-NOINFO
(5 sessions)
COMM-NO-INFO
(5 sessions)

different information revelation strategies. For this purpose
we focus on a multi-round auction in which bidders submit
bids through multiple iterations or rounds before a final set
of winners are determined. The results of our study provide
some benchmark findings which can inform field experimental trials on spatial conservation auctions involving
actual producers.
Experimental Design
Since we are interested in spatial coordination, in the experiment, twelve subjects are located on a circular geographical landscape on which each person has a left and a
right neighbor. Subjects earn money depending upon
whether they are selected as winners in the auction or not
as well as whether their neighbors have been selected at the
end of multiple bidding rounds. Each subject is endowed
with three land use projects or items marked as Red, Green
and Blue items. During the auction subjects select and submit a bid for one of these items. Terms such as conservation, ecosystem services and land use projects are not mentioned in the auction as these can impact subject behaviors
in the lab which in turn would make isolation of the treatment effect (if any) challenging – i.e. it would be difficult to
conclude whether subjects are responding to the treatment
manipulation or to the environmental framing.

With Absolute Value
Benefit Information

With Rank Value Benefit
Information

NO-COMM-VALUE
(5 sessions)

NO-COMM-RANK
(5 sessions)

COMM-VALUE
(5 sessions)

COMM-RANK
(5 sessions)

We conducted five experimental sessions, each with 12
participants recruited from undergraduate student population at University of Nebraska-Lincoln. Participants
earned a $9 show-up fee and money made during the experiment. Earnings were recorded in Experimental Currency Units (ECUs) and the experiment was conducted in
Z-tree (Fischbacher, 2007). Within a session, subjects
participated in nine multi-round periods, with a minimum of four and a maximum of seven rounds per period.
Participants were not informed about the fixed budget of
4,500 ECUs that was used to procure projects and pay
winners in each auction period. This figure remained
constant across all treatments.
Each session included the four components: a paid risk
preference elicitation exercise (Holt and Laury 2002), an
unpaid practice auction to familiarize participants with
the user interface, nine paying periods and a demographic survey. Before beginning the experiment, a presentation was made to the subjects about the different experimental features. Handouts were also provided to which
subjects could refer during the experiment. In the
COMM treatments, at the beginning of each auction
round, subjects had the opportunity to message their

neighbors for a duration of 30 seconds through two chat
boxes displayed on their screen. Once 30 seconds were over,
the chat content was displayed for an additional 10 seconds
after which subjects proceeded to the item selection phase
of the auction period. Instructions barred subjects from
revealing their identity to neighbors and asked them to be
civil to one another. All features of the auction could be discussed through the communication channels.

scores were then ranked in descending order and
combinations of projects were provisionally accepted
based on the scores until the budget was exhausted.

At this stage, a Results Screen was displayed on which
subjects received feedback about auction outcomes.
This included information about (i) whether their
item had been selected, (ii) whether neighbors items
had been selected and if yes, which colored item, (iii)
their provisional earnings for the round or their actual
We used three different sets of cost and quality values to
earnings if they were winners in the period and (iv)
determine the cost and quality endowments for each subject
the total bonus earned. For easy reference the cost and
in a period. Each set was used in three auction periods thus
quality value (in VALUE-NO-COMM and VALUEminimizing the influence of any possible scale effects. The
COMM sessions) of the submitted item was also provalues were randomly drawn from two uniform distribuvided. Finally, this screen included a History Table
tions –cost ~[0, 1000] and quality ~ [0, 100].. They were chothat recorded the above values for all rounds of a perisen such that in the absence of asymmetric information, the
od and all auction periods. Subjects were informed
auctioneer would choose 6 out of 12 projects in all periods,
whether or not their offer had been provisionally acinvolve the selection of multiple items of the same color and
cepted at the end of the round and then could adjust
represent different spatial configurations. Figure 1 indicates
their offers in response to the information about the
the spatial configurations of the winning projects. The All
provisional status of their offer from the previous
Blue pattern is the Single Large reserve pattern with 5
round. However, submitted
offers could only be reduced in subsequent rounds
of the period. At the conclusion of each period, participants were informed
about whether or not their
offer had been accepted and
winners' earnings were updated on the basis of the
Figure 1: First-Best Spatial Configurations in 9 Auction Periods.
difference between their
winning item's offer and its
corresponding cost and bonus paid if one or both
shared borders between the selected projects, the All Green
neighbors same colored item was also part of the winis the Several Small reserve pattern with a total of 4 shared
ning allocation.
borders and last, the All Red is the Asymmetric reserve pattern with 4 shared borders as well. The Single Large pattern
Metrics of Analysis:
was assigned to Periods 1, 4 and 7; Several Small to 2, 5 and
In order to analyze auction performance, we consider
8; and Asymmetric to 3, 6 and 9. The parameters were asthe Percentage of Optimal Cost-Effectiveness Ratio
signed to subjects such that (i) even if neighbors exchanged
(POCER) measured as the degree of cost-effectiveness
cost and quality endowment information via chatting, subof the conservation auction. POCER is defined as
jects did not know that the endowments from the past periods were being repeated, (ii) never faced the same endowment in multiple periods, and (iii) if everyone bid at cost,
then across all 9 periods, 6 people would win 4 times and
the other 6 would win 5 times.
After all bids had been submitted in a round, combinations
of bids were evaluated and were given a score equal to the
sum of quality of the submitted items divided by the sum of
bids. When calculating the total benefit, twice the value of
an environmental premium (= 25) (once for each adjacent
project if any) was added. Similarly, twice the value of the
bonus (= 50 ECU) was added to the total sum of bids. The

xi = 1 if ith subject is a winner, 0 otherwise
X*
i

= 1 if ith subject is winner in the first-best allocation,
O otherwise

First, consider the numerator of POCER. In the numerator of the fraction,Ʃi qi xi represents the sum of
environmental benefits of all items accepted by the

auctioneer from set of winning bidders i and p Ʃi xi the sum
of total environmental premiums. In the denominator of
the fraction, Ʃ oi xi represents the sum of selected bids from
the set of winning bidders i and b Ʃi(xj + xk) xi the total bonuses paid for every shared border between a adjacent selected items of the same color. This amount represents the
total expenditure of the auction. In a similar fashion the
fraction in the denominator represents the total environmental benefits and expenses in the auction when the first
best allocation is selected with bids submitted equal to costs
so that there are no information rents.
Results:
Figure 2 presents a histogram of the number of shared borders between neighboring projects of the same color under
the different treatments for each of the three spatial configurations. It is evident that the bonus payments are successful in procuring identical items representing the same land
use projects from neighbors.
Figure 3 represents the average POCER values by treatment
and spatial configuration and indicates that average costeffectiveness is lower when subjects have to coordinate to
create a large core than if they have to create two identical
small reserves or two small but different sized reserves. This
outcome is not surprising since creation of a large core requires coordinated effort of six players while the other configurations can be created by fewer people coordinating.

Since performance depends upon coordination, average performance is lower for all treatments when creating a large core relative to the other patterns. Moreover, for both Single Large and Asymmetric patterns,
performance is the lowest in both the NO-INFO treatments compared to the VALUE and RANK information treatments for both communication conditions.
For a systematic analysis of these findings, we present
the results of random effects regression model in Table
2 with POCER obtained in the final round of every
period for each session as the dependent variable. The
independent variables include dummy variables for
the VALUE, RANK and COMM treatments, a Period
variable capturing the effect of subject experience in
the auction on performance, dummy variables for the
two spatial configurations – Several Small and Asymmetric (with the Single Large pattern and NO-INFOCOMM condition being the omitted category) and
interaction terms between these variables to control
for the fact that the impact of the information and
communication treatments can be different for the
different periods in which the first best allocation involves different spatial configurations. The standard
errors are clustered at the session level to control for
unobserved heterogeneity across the sessions.

Figure 2: Histogram of Number of Shared Borders between Winning Projects of Same Color

Figure 3: Average POCER by Treatment and Spatial Configuration
The positive and significant estimates for the VALUE and
RANK Treatment dummy variables suggest that when the
first best allocation constitutes a Single Large Reserve, auction performance is improved via higher cost-effectiveness
when environmental benefit information (in either absolute
or ranked format) is provided to subjects compared to when
this information is suppressed. Moreover, the RANK condition performs better than the VALUE condition. Communication does not seem to have any impact on performance
when no information or only VALUE information is provided although in the case of the RANK treatment, communication marginally reduces performance.
Focusing on the Several Small condition, VALUE information again improves efficiency over the NO-INFO condition although the effect is damped owing to the negative
interaction effect between the information treatment and
the Several Small dummy variable. Communication again
has no impact on outcomes. Similar outcomes are obtained
for the RANK treatment when no communication is permitted and like in the case of the Single Large condition,
performance is higher relative to the VALUE treatment as
well. However performance is higher for the COMMRANK condition, an outcome different from that obtained
for the Single Large Case.
Next, there seems to be no impact of the information and
communication treatment on outcomes when considering
the Asymmetric spatial configuration. However, the positive
estimate for the Asymmetric dummy variable suggests that
performance is better for this condition relative to SingleLarge case. However, this effect is only marginally significant.
Finally, the estimate for the Period variable is positive and
significant suggesting that auction experience improves efficiency. However, this result is to be interpreted with caution

because there is some collinearity between the Period
variable and the spatial configuration dummies since the
configurations were assigned to periods in a sequential
fashion leading to potential order effects.
Conclusion:
Our results show that providing ranked and absolute
environmental benefit information improves auction
performance relative to when no information is provided with ranked information having the greatest impact
on efficiency. This is true regardless of the spatial configuration targeted. The impact of communication however seems to depend upon the information revelation and
spatial configuration. In summary, by providing ranked
information, the auctioneer can place checks on rent
seeking while still facilitating the bidding exercise. Information provision can also promote auction transparency goals fostering producers' trust in the government,
which could be useful in encouraging their participation
in the auction. Subsequent analysis will explore the
sources of these treatment differences through an examination of individual behavior and analysis of bidders’
communications as well as delve deeper into factors impacting item selection.

Table 2: Results of Random Effects Regression Analysis for Percentage of
Optimal Cost Effectiveness Ratio

Independent Variables
Value Treatment
Rank Treatment
Communication Treatment
Period
Several Small
Asymmetric
Communication X Value
Communication X Rank
Rank X Several Small
Value X Several Small
Value X Asymmetric
Rank X Asymmetric
Communication X Asymmetric
Communication X Several Small
Communication X Value X Several Small
Communication X Rank X Several Small
Communication X Value X Asymmetric
Communication X Rank X Asymmetric
Constant
Observations
Number of Sessions

POCER
0.0290**
(0.0131)
0.0655***
(0.0201)
0.0170
(0.0117)
0.00540***
(0.00105)
0.0780***
(0.0102)
0.0559*
(0.0300)
0.00225
(0.0172)
-0.0467*
(0.0257)
-0.0605***
(0.0170)
-0.0369***
(0.0138)
-0.0110
(0.0315)
-0.0225
(0.0317)
0.0164
(0.0315)
-0.0142
(0.0117)
0.0257
(0.0172)
0.0540**
(0.0232)
0.0163
(0.0364)
0.0218
(0.0353)
0.776***
(0.0107)
270
30

Robust standard errors in parentheses; ***p<0.01, ** p<.0.05, p<0.1
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